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In his article 'The Thought', Frege writes: 
 
Every one is presented to himself in a particular and primitive way, in which 
he is presented to no one else. So, when Dr. Lauben thinks that he has been 
wounded, he will probably take as a basis this primitive way in which he is 
presented to himself. And only Dr. Lauben himself can grasp thoughts 
determined in this way. But now he may want to communicate with others. He 
cannot communicate a thought which he alone can grasp. Therefore, if he now 
says 'I have been wounded', he must use the 'I' in a sense which can be grasped 
by others, perhaps in the sense of 'he who is speaking to you at this moment'... 
(Frege 1918-19:25-6) 
 
From this passage, two important ideas can be extracted. The first one is commonly 
accepted nowadays: 
 
(a)   First person thoughts concerning a person A can be grasped or entertained only 
by A. Another person, B, can entertain thoughts about A, but not first person 
thoughts about A: only A can think of himself in the first person. To be sure, B 
can also entertain first person thoughts; but these thoughts will be about B, not 
about A. (Even if B falsely believes that he is A, that would not make his first 
person thoughts thoughts about A.) 
 
Once we accept (a), a problem arises, which I call 'the paradox of the first person'. First 
person thoughts are private, hence incommunicable; yet we do communicate them, by 
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uttering first person sentences. How do we manage to do this? Frege's second idea is 
meant to solve the paradox: 
 
(b)   There are two sorts of senses or modes of presentation associated with the first 
person. Let us call the 'special and primitive' mode of presentation which occurs 
in first person thoughts 'Ego' or rather 'Egox' where 'x' stands for the name of the 
person thinking the thought (for example 'EgoLauben' in the case of first person 
thoughts about Lauben).1 This mode of presentation must be distinguished from 
the mode of presentation associated with the word 'I' in communication ('he who 
is speaking to you at this moment'). The latter can be grasped by others, the 
former cannot. 
 
The paradox is solved because, according to Frege, we do not communicate the 
original, incommunicable first person thought involving the mode of presentation 
Egox, but a different thought involving the other sort of mode of presentation. 
 One might think (and some have said) that the distinction between the two 
modes of presentation is ad hoc and designed only to solve a particular problem. I, on 
the contrary, think it is an essential distinction — one which lies at the very foundation 
of the theory of language use. In earlier writings (Recanati 1990, 1993) I have drawn a 
similar distinction on quite independent grounds. The mode of presentation 'he who is 
speaking to you at this moment' — technically, 'the utterer of this token' — closely 
corresponds to the conventional meaning of 'I' (at least if the token-reflexive analysis of 
indexicals is correct), yet it is clearly distinct from the mode of presentation that occurs 
in our first person thoughts, i.e. the special and primitive way in which every one is 
presented to himself.2 This distinction between what I called 'linguistic' and 
'psychological' modes of presentation is general (it affects every indexical, not merely 
'I') and it holds whether or not we like Frege's solution to the paradox of the first 
person. 
 Even though it is far from ad hoc, Frege's solution is not altogether satisfactory, 
for it is sketchy and incomplete. What is the relation between the two sorts of mode of 
presentation mentioned in (b)? What makes it possible for the intersubjective sense 
associated with 'I' in communication to stand for the private sense Egox which cannot 
be directly communicated? These are important questions which Frege does not 
address, let alone answer.  
                                                 
1 This notation is Peacocke's. See Peacocke 1981, 1983. 
2 This is demonstrated, inter alia, by the fact that the utterer of a token might not realize 
that he (he himself*, as Castañeda would say) is the utterer of this token. To be sure, 
such a situation would be quite extraordinary, but it is by no means impossible. 
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 There is another solution to the paradox, which does not rely on the distinction 
between the two sorts of mode of presentation but on another distinction (Dummett 
1981: 122-3). The speaker's first person thought is not, and cannot be, 'communicated' 
because the hearer does not, and could not, come to entertain that very thought as a 
result of the communication process. Still, it may be argued, the speaker's first person 
thought which is expressed by the utterance 'I have been wounded' can be recognized as 
such by the hearer. Even if the speaker's thought is unavailable to the hearer, the 
utterance may inform the hearer that the speaker entertains a certain type of thought, 
which he himself (the hearer) is unable to entertain. The speaker who says 'I have been 
wounded' expresses a first person thought, to the effect that he himself has been 
wounded. The hearer, upon understanding the utterance, can only form a different 
thought: 'He has been wounded'. Unlike the speaker, the hearer does not think of the 
referent (i.e. the speaker) in a first person way. So the speaker's thought has not been 
'communicated' in the strong sense of the term. Yet it has been communicated in a 
weaker sense: Leo Peter knows which thought Lauben has expressed in saying 'I have 
been wounded'. Along these lines, it may be found unnecessary to distinguish between 
two sorts of thought, that which Lauben privately entertains and that which he 
communicates. To account for the communication of first person thoughts despite the 
'incommunicability' of the latter one needs only to draw a distinction between two 
forms of communication: an utterance can 'express' a thought (weak communication) 
even if that thought is not thereby made available to the hearer (strong communication). 
 My primary aim in this paper is to fill the gap in Frege's account so as to make it 
satisfactory. But I will start by considering the alternative account and raising an 
objection to it. To meet the objection I will suggest an improvement of the alternative 
account which makes it indistinguishable from Frege's. The problem of the relation 
between the two modes of presentation will be solved along the way. 
 
2 
Even though is departs from Frege's own solution, the alternative account is Fregean in 
spirit. From a Fregean point of view, it has the great merit of allowing one to maintain 
the equation of thought and semantic content. 
 The semantic content of an utterance — that which the utterance expresses and 
which must be grasped for it to be correctly understood — is by definition an 'objective' 
property of that utterance which can be recognized by both speaker and hearer and 
which remains stable in the process of communication; but the required stability cannot 
be found at the level of thoughts, or so it seems. The first person thought which the 
speaker expresses by saying 'I have been wounded' differs from the hearer's thought 
formed upon understanding the utterance — they involve different modes of 
presentation of Lauben. The sentence means the same thing for speaker and hearer, and 
the statement that is made — to the effect that Lauben has been wounded — is also the 
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same for both, but the associated thoughts change as communication proceeeds from 
speaker to hearer. This is what makes the Russellian notion of a (singular) 'proposition' 
an arguably better candidate for the status of semantic content than the Fregean notion 
of a thought. For the proposition ('what is said', the 'statement' that is made) remains 
constant from one person to the next, in contrast to the thought. As John Perry says, 
'one reason we need singular propositions is to get at what we seek to preserve when we 
communicate with those who are in different contexts' (Perry 1988: 4).  
 The alternative account disposes of this objection to Frege's equation of thought 
and semantic content. Even though the speaker's thought is tied to his own point of 
view and cannot be entertained by someone else (e.g. the hearer), still, it is this thought 
which is expressed by the utterance and can be recognized as such by the hearer. Its 
being publicly recognizable confers a sufficient objectivity on the speaker's thought, 
despite its essential subjectivity, to make it a plausible candidate for the status of 
semantic content. 
 Let us analyse the theoretical move at work here. Two points of view are 
involved in the communication process: that of the speaker and that of the hearer. In 
Frege's example the speaker's thought includes the mode of presentation Egox, while 
the hearer's thought, formed upon understanding the utterance, is a demonstrative, third 
person thought: 'He has been wounded'. As long as the speaker's thought is seen as on 
the same footing as the hearer's, it is tied to a particular point of view and lacks the sort 
of objectivity needed to equate it with the utterance's semantic content. The move 
consists in privileging the speaker's thought and giving primacy to his point of view 
over the hearer's. On the 'alternative account' I have sketched (following Dummett), it is 
the speaker's first person thought rather than the hearer's which is objectively 
'expressed' by the utterance and recognized as such by all participants in the speech 
episode. 
 One possible objection to this move is that it is somehow arbitrary. How do we 
choose the particular point of view to be privileged? On intuitive grounds it seems 
natural to select the point of view of the speaker, yet there are also reasons to select the 
hearer's point of view. As Evans emphasized, what matters, when we want to 
individuate semantic content, is what would count as a proper understanding of an 
utterance (Evans 1982: 92, 143n, 171, etc.); but 'understanding' defines the task of the 
hearer. Thus it is the hearer's point of view which Evans privileges. As a result of that 
choice he is led to deny that 'I' expresses the concept Egox: according to him, 'I' 
expresses a demonstrative concept akin to that expressed by the demonstrative phrase 
'that person'. 
 To overcome the difficulty, one may try a slightly different route. Instead of 
privileging a particular point of view (that of the speaker or that of the hearer), we may 
decide to focus on what is common to both points of view. This more or less 
corresponds to the Russellian strategy. According to the Russellian, what is common to 
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the speaker's thought that he himself has been wounded and to the hearer's thought that 
that man, Lauben, has been wounded, is the singular proposition: <Lauben, the 
property of having been wounded>, that is, the state of affairs which both thoughts 
represent (their common 'incremental truth-conditions', in Perry's terminology [Perry 
1990]). Now this commonalist strategy can also be opted for in a Fregean framework, 
for there is more that is common to both thoughts than merely the state of affairs they 
represent at the level of 'incremental truth-conditions'. In particular, there is more that 
is common to the modes of presentation under which Lauben and his addressee 
respectively think of Lauben than merely the reference, i.e. what these modes of 
presentation are modes of presentation of. 
 
3 
Most authors in the field, whether Russellian or Fregean, draw a distinction between 
descriptive and nondescriptive modes of presentation. Indexicals and proper names 
typically express nondescriptive modes of presentation, in contrast to (attributively 
used) definite descriptions, which express descriptive modes of presentation.3 
 What are nondescriptive modes of presentation? Like a number of contemporary 
authors, I construe 'nondescriptive' modes of presentation as dossiers of information. 
Thus EgoLauben is Lauben's dossier for whatever information he gains about himself. 
What is 'special and primitive' about this sort of dossier is that Lauben — like all of us 
— has a particular way of acquiring information about himself, such that (i) only 
Lauben can acquire information about Lauben in this way, and (ii) Lauben can acquire 
information in this way only about Lauben. An 'Ego'-dossier serves as repository for 
information gained in this particular way (the first person way). 
 Qua dossier, a nondescriptive mode of presentation contains information about 
whatever the dossier concerns. This allows for the following possibility: two dossiers 
which differ by their global content and/or by the sort of dossier they are may 
nevertheless have something in common, namely part of their content — some 
particular piece of information which they both contain. This is what happens in Frege's 
example. Both the thought of the speaker and that of the hearer include a mode of 
presentation which corresponds to their dossier concerning Lauben. The modes of 
presentation in question are quite different from each other: the speaker's is a first 
person mode of presentation (i.e. it corresponds to a dossier based on the special way of 
acquiring information mentioned above) while the hearer's is a third person mode of 
presentation. Nor do they contain the same information: there are things which Lauben 
knows about Lauben which his hearer does not know, and the other way round. But 
there are also pieces of information which both dossiers contain — there are things 
                                                 
3 The modes of presentation in question, whether descriptive or nondescriptive, are all 
'psychological' modes of presentation in the sense of section 1. 
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which both Lauben and his hearer know about Lauben. The latter provide identificatory 
facts which Lauben and his hearer can appeal to in order to secure reference when 
communicating about Lauben. In particular, both Lauben's and his hearer's dossier 
concerning Lauben include the information that Lauben is the utterer of this token of 'I 
have been wounded'. That is part of Lauben's current notion of himself as much as it is 
part of his hearer's current notion of Lauben: Lauben is conscious of being the utterer, 
and the hearer also knows that Lauben is the utterer, the man speaking to him at this 
moment. That information is part of both dossiers, even though one is a first person 
dossier and the other a third person dossier. Now that specific aspect common to both 
the speaker's and the hearer's notion of the reference is, I suggest, what is expressed by 
the linguistic expression 'I'. The reference of 'I' is presented as being the utterer of this 
token (linguistic mode of presentation). That linguistic mode of presentation is 
intersubjective, unlike the psychological mode of presentation which is subjective (i.e. 
the notion of himself, on the speaker's side, or the notion of that man, on the hearer's 
side); but the former may be construed as an aspect  or part of the latter, an aspect (or 
part) which is common to the speaker's and the hearer's point of view. 
 Note that the identificatory fact which Lauben appeals to in order to secure 
reference to himself in communication belongs to a special category of identificatory 
facts: the category of communication-specific identificatory facts. Those facts do not 
exist independently of communication but are created in the very process of 
communication (Benveniste 1956). They are aspects of the speech situation, and as 
such they are automatically (and mutually) known to both speaker and hearer qua 
participants in that situation. Thus both the speaker and the hearer (in a normal 
conversational setting) know that the speaker — say Lauben — is the speaker, that the 
hearer — say, Leo Peter — is the hearer, and so forth. This enables the speaker to use 
these mutually manifest facts in referring to the speaker, the hearer and other aspects of 
the speech situation. Indexicals are conventional means of doing so: the linguistic 
modes of presentation conventionally expressed by indexicals such as 'I' or 'you' ('the 
utterer', 'the addressee') correspond to facts about their referents which are created by 
the speech situation itself and are therefore mutually manifest to participants in the 
speech situation.  
 Since the identificatory fact  appealed to by virtue of the linguistic sense of the 
indexical is mutually known to the speaker and his hearer, it belongs to their respective 
dossiers concerning the reference — the speaker's first person dossier and the hearer's 
third person dossier. The linguistic sense of the indexical can therefore stand for both 
dossiers through a cognitive process of 'synecdoche' (Recanati 1993): the part stands for 
the whole. The linguistic sense of 'I' ('the utterer of this token') stands for the speaker's 
notion of himself because it corresponds to an aspect of that notion, to some 
information which the speaker's Ego-dossier contains (the information that he is the 
utterer of this token). Interpreting the utterance — the hearer's task — consists in going 
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back from the part to the whole; but it is not the same whole at both ends of the 
communicative process. We start with the speaker's thought which involves his first 
person dossier. The latter does not go into the semantic content of the utterance, which 
contains only the linguistic sense of 'I', corresponding to an aspect or part of the original 
dossier. At the other end we find the hearer's thought, formed by 'interpreting' the 
utterance's semantic content and somehow enriching it with the hearer's own dossier 
concerning the speaker, which dossier also contains as a component part the 
identificatory fact appealed to by the indexical. 
 On this view Frege was right: that which is communicated — the utterance's 
semantic content — is not quite the speaker's original thought. It involves a mode of 
presentation ('the utterer of this token') which is closely related to the linguistic 
meaning of 'I' and differs from the special and primitive mode of presentation Egox 
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